by Rustam Taghizade
Israel and Hezbollah. The influence of political processes in the Middle East on the South Caucasus
In excess of nine months after the conclusion of hostilities between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the prospect of a second, potentially larger conflict with Hezbollah on the northern border has emerged as a significant concern. In June, the Israel Defense Forces announced their intention to launch a large-scale military operation in southern Lebanon. In mid-July, Hassan Nasrullah, the leader of Hezbollah, stated that the Iran-backed Shia group was prepared to launch rocket attacks into broader areas of Israel. The 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah resulted in a stalemate. Hezbollah’s arsenal is seven times larger than that of Hamas, and it has a greater number of weapons with greater lethal capacity. Hezbollah has frequently indicated its intention to launch rocket attacks against northern Israeli regions. Yesterday, the consequences of Hezbollah’s attack resulted in the deaths of civilians. Notwithstanding the stipulations of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which prohibit Hezbollah from maintaining a military presence south of the Litani River, Hezbollah has persistently violated this resolution, engaging in regular attacks against Israel in proximity to the border. In recent days, the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the United States has been observed. The meetings provided an opportunity to discuss the current state of affairs in the Middle East with representatives from both the Democratic and Republican parties.
What potential scenarios could emerge between Israel and Hezbollah?
U.S. officials have indicated that neither Israel nor Hezbollah leaders are seeking military conflict. However, the Netanyahu government is facing significant domestic pressure to ensure the safe return of Israeli citizens to their communities in the north. Israeli leaders may be prepared to launch a comprehensive military campaign against Hezbollah, targeting thousands of facilities in southern Lebanon within the first 24 hours with the objective of neutralising the Iranian-backed faction’s unparalleled strategic arsenal. Airstrikes targeting Hezbollah command and control could continue as far as Beirut with the aim of rapidly concluding the conflict and preventing the militant group from attacking Israel’s sensitive electrical and water infrastructure, airports, naval facilities and air defences.
The influence of political processes in the Middle East on the South Caucasus. It seems reasonable to posit that the political processes currently underway in the Middle East will have an impact on the South Caucasus region. In recent months, there has been a notable improvement in the political relations between Azerbaijan and Iran. Following the assault on the Azerbaijani embassy, the level of tension between Azerbaijan and Iran reached its zenith. In mid-July, the embassy resumed its operations. It seems reasonable to posit that the recently elected Iranian president is not inclined to sever relations with Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, reports have emerged indicating that Iran is supplying Armenia with military equipment. A war with Hezbollah could place Iran in a challenging position. In recent times, the geopolitical situation in Iran has been characterised by a certain degree of tension. Israel is a strategic partner of Azerbaijan. Despite the absence of overtly aggressive actions on the part of Iran towards Azerbaijan, it is likely that the country will engage in a campaign of information warfare. Furthermore, the conflict may also assume a religious and ideological dimension. This is a strategy that Iran has employed on numerous occasions. The primary objective of Iran is to impede the growth of Azerbaijan’s influence in the region and to sever amicable relations with Israel. In general, the political situation in the South Caucasus continues to display a number of complex features. Following the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has adopted a cautious approach in the region. Iran has frequently sought to exploit tensions between Israel and Azerbaijan. It seems plausible that Iran may still take steps against Azerbaijan. However, given Iran’s current political situation, it is likely to pursue a neighbourhood policy with Azerbaijan. This policy is not a long-term strategy.
The role of Turkey and the policy of Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus region.
Recently we have seen the harsh rhetoric coming from Turkey against Israel. I think this rhetoric will continue. It shows that Turkey exists in the struggle for the region. However, Azerbaijan will continue its cooperation with Israel. Azerbaijan has a delicate policy. With this policy, it will maintain good relations with both Israel and Turkey. Azerbaijan will be cautious in its policy towards Iran. These ongoing processes in the Middle East will affect Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. Therefore, Azerbaijan should protect and strengthen its historical cooperation with Israel using the multi-vector policy method. I think that the attempt to break the friendly relations between Azerbaijan and Israel will not succeed. Turkey wants to gather the votes of Muslim countries in more regions. But not all Arab states have good relations with Turkey. And Israel should stay away from harsh rhetoric and try to make Turkey neutral. Of course, this equation will take some time. Conversely, the actions that Turkey is taking are being mirrored in the United States. The United States has thus far declined to allow Turkey to assume a significant political role at this juncture.
Furthermore, it is pertinent to recall the assault perpetrated by Azerbaijan on Sojar in Turkey in May. The rationale behind this assault, which was perpetrated by entities affiliated with Iran, was the sale of Azerbaijani oil to Israel. It is evident that this was done deliberately. It is regrettable that this issue was not given sufficient attention in Turkey. The government’s promotion of religion and the proliferation of extremist groups in Turkey served to accelerate these processes. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan persisted with its political trajectory. In his 2023 address, President Ilham Aliyev stated:[1] “We have a common vision, and it is evident that Azerbaijan exerts considerable influence on the global and regional stages.” You informed me of Azerbaijan’s influence on the European energy sector, the region in general, Asia, and the Middle East, which is of particular relevance to us. We undertook an examination of the global and regional security structure posed by Iran and engaged in a comprehensive discussion on this matter. It is our hope that opportunities will arise for the furtherance of cooperation in the realms of science, agriculture, and other areas that were mentioned by the President in his opening remarks. It is evident that Ilham Aliyev attaches significant importance to relations with Israel.
This is also a factor that reinforces Azerbaijan’s defence industry. The strategic victories that Azerbaijan achieved in the Second Karabakh War were made possible by the use of Harop drones. Israel has consistently demonstrated political support for Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani authorities are concerned that Iran may exploit religious sentiments to influence Baku. Consequently, the advent of Huseyyun, an armed faction affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was perceived as a potential threat to the establishment of a theocratic state bearing resemblance to Iran. Despite the recent improvement in relations between Iran and Azerbaijan, it is my assessment that this is a fragile state of affairs. Iran’s strategy has not yielded significant results in the South Caucasus region. Israel’s principal objective is the destruction of Iran’s proxy forces. The state of Azerbaijan, which has established a new reality in the South Caucasus, continues its policy successfully, not shying away from Iran’s propaganda machine. It is my opinion that there will be a more complex political equation game in the region. Azerbaijan should exercise greater caution in this game. After the second Karabakh war, Azerbaijan does not require a new conflict.
By Political Analyst Rustam Taghizade.
[1] https://president.az/az/articles/view/60054