by Giovanni Giacalone
Mohamad Abedini Najafabadi’s arrest
On December 16th 2024, Iranian citizen Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi was arrested by the Italian authorities on US request after landing at Milan’s Malpensa airport.
As indicated in the press release of the DOJ, Abedini and his colleague Mahdi Mohammad Sadeghi (who was arrested in Massachusetts) have been charged with conspiring to export sophisticated electronic components from the United States to Iran in violation of US export control and sanctions laws. Abedini is also charged with providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), that resulted in the deaths of US military personnel; specifically, the January 28th, 2024, drone strike on the Tower 22 outpost in Jordan, that killed three US soldiers and injured more than 40. According to the FBI, the drone used in the attack carried out by Tehran-backed militias was equipped with a navigation system produced by Abedini’s company.
Abedini graduated from Sharif University, nicknamed “the MIT of Iran”, and was sanctioned by the European Union for its ties with the Iranian government, specifically with the Pasdaran, for the development of ballistic missiles. After graduating in 2019, Abedini moved to Lausanne, Switzerland, to work as a postdoctoral researcher at the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne and founded Illumove SA, a start-up registered at the Innovation Park of that same Swiss school, as a cover for his previously founded Iranian company, to circumvent the sanctions and purchase components from the United States.
Cecilia Sala’s arrest
Three days after Abedini’s arrest, on December 19th, 2024, Italian journalist Cecilia Sala was apprehended from her hotel in Teheran and placed under arrest, without any clear reason, by the Iranian authorities who much later, charged her with “violating Islamic law”.
Sala left Rome for Iran on December 12th, with a regular visa, to conduct interviews and record some episodes for the podcast Stories that she edits for Chore Media. She was supposed to fly back to Italy on December 20th, but she never made it. Her phone suddenly went silent, and none of her Iranian contacts knew what had happened to her. The following day, she emerged with two brief phone calls to her mother and her partner where she said she had been arrested and locked in the infamous Evin prison.
The United States forwarded Abedini’s extradition request on December 28th, while more documentation was yet to arrive from Washington. However, Italy decided to release him after consultation with the US and particularly between Italian PM Giorgia Meloni and Donald Trump.
The objective of Cecilia Sala’s detention was clear: pressure Italy to release Abedini in exchange for the journalist. It’s a classic of the Iranian regime’s well known “hostage diplomacy”. In addition, it is also possible that Italy did not want to harm relations with Iran, as stated by the Iranian authorities who accused Washington of trying to ruin relations between Rome and Teheran.
No demonstrations against the regime
On January 3rd, 2025, Cecilia Sala’s family requested media silence regarding the case because of the situation’s sensitivity. Public debate on what should have been done (or not) could have complicated things and delayed potential solutions.
The request for media silence announced by the Sala family is understandable and indicated ongoing secret negotiations between the Italian authorities (the Presidency of the Council of Ministries, the Foreign Ministry and AISE, Italy’s foreign intelligence) and the Iranian regime.
Following the appeal by Sala’s parents, the Radical Party announced that it canceled a demonstration scheduled for January 6th in front of the Iranian embassy in Rome.
That was quite an unexpected move by the Radicals, considering that just a few days before they announced that they would not have complied with the government’s request not to demonstrate against the Iranian regime, as reported in an article by Il Giornale:
“The Italian government requested the public not to demonstrate against the Iranian regime, as illustrated by members of the Radical Party: “For ten days an Italian journalist has been in the hands of the bloodthirsty and liberticidal theocratic Iranian regime. The Italian government has asked not to demonstrate, but we disobey because when a journalist from a democratic country who only provides information is arrested without charge in a dictatorial country like Iran, the last thing to do is remain silent”.
It is worth noticing that just a few days after Sala’s arrest, the Italian press started discussing possible technicalities that could have led to the release of Abedini (which is exactly what happened shortly after).
As well-explained in an article by the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, signed by Giovanni Bianconi, and published on January 3rd, 2025, the Italian judicial system is independent of political power and decisions will be taken by the judges based on legal considerations, but if they were to say no to Abedini’s release pending a decision on extradition, the government would still have the possibility of revoking the arrest warrant and allowing the Iranian to return home. The code provides that the revocation of the precautionary measure for extradition purposes “is always ordered if the Minister of Justice requests it”. In addition, the IRGC is not listed as a terrorist entity in Italy, and this could also be used as a pretext to release Abedini.
Meanwhile, other Italian media even began to write about Abedini’s great will to learn the Italian language while in custody, and to pray for Cecilia Sala. Who were they trying to impress?
Abedini’s release
Interestingly, after Sala’s detention on December 19th, Milan’s Public Prosecutor’s Office opened a model 45 file, that is, without suspects and without a criminal title, on the modality of Abedini’s arrest. The investigation concerns the short time between the issuance of the arrest warrant for extradition purposes, dated December 13th, and Abedini’s arrest occurred in less than three days. What’s the point of complying with an international arrest warrant on December 16th, and then opening a model 45 file, only after Sala’s abduction, to examine if the arrest was properly executed?
Mohammad Abedini was released shortly after 9 am on Sunday January 12th, 2025, at the request of the Italian Minister of Justice, Caro Nordio. The judges of Milan’s Appeal Court, who were set to decide on Abedini’s house arrest request the following Wednesday, therefore had to proceed with Abedini’s release, since the final word in any case belonged to the Minister. Abedini was later flown back to Iran.
While the decision was clearly political, the Italian Interior Minister provided two main technical reasons to back the release of the Iranian engineer: one of the crimes Abedini is accused of – “criminal conspiracy to violate the law on economic powers in the event of an international emergency”, is not foreseen in Italy: the American law refers to the US federal law, which gives the US president the power to identify any threat originating outside the United States. Furthermore, the other two hypotheses of crime, according to which the engineer with his Swiss drone company supported the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (included by the US among the terrorist organizations), were not confirmed. In addition, the IRGC are not blacklisted as a terrorist organization in Italy.
Satisfaction was expressed by Teheran, which praised “the cooperation of all interested parties”. It was a “misunderstanding” – according to the official agency of the Iranian judiciary, Mizan – but the “problem was resolved thanks to the follow-up given by the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the negotiations between the intelligence of the Islamic Republic and the Italian secret services”, as written by the Italian press agency Ansa.
Italy – Iran relations
It is amusing to hear how the Iranian Foreign Ministry complained about “the United States using the hostage policy”, when the Iranian regime is globally famous for hostage-taking and the previously cited “hostage diplomacy”.
It’s obvious that there is a clear difference between an arrest made under international law, as in the case of Abedini, and the kidnapping of a journalist to be used as a bargaining chip. Cecilia Sala’s detention is nothing other than an act of terrorism to obtain Abedini’s release and avoid extradition to the United States.
As explained by Prof. Adrian Calamel, an Iran expert and a Terrorism Fellow at the Arabian Peninsula Institute:
“Tehran’s tactics have been categorized or defined as hostage diplomacy when in fact it is pure terrorism. The strategy has been quite simple, while the world plays inside the diplomatic sandbox the regime is playing outside, nabbing innocent people to be used as bargaining chips for billions of dollars or to spring a regime operative from arrest, extradition and imprisonment, the case with Cecilia Sala is no different”.
Additionally, the Iranian FM also complained about the United States wanting to harm Italy-Iran relations. What does that mean? Well, Italy cannot be considered a country hostile to Iran. Unlike Germany, there have so far been no major operations against Iranian terror assets, the IRGC is not blacklisted as a terrorist entity, and the assurances received by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Iranian regime regarding the protection of Italian UNIFIL soldiers in Lebanon, following Tehran’s missile attack against Israel, date back to just last April.
This is interesting, considering that on October 15th 2024, during a Senate audition, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni boasted that Italy was the strictest in blocking weapons sales to Israel (Iran’s arch enemy in the Middle East):
“I would like to point out that the Italian position of the complete blocking of all new licenses is much more restrictive than that applied by our partners, France, Germany and the United Kingdom: these partners continue to operate also for new licenses on a case-by-case basis, we have blocked everything”.
And let’s not forget the trade relations between the two countries. With a +9%, Italy recorded an increase in trade with Iran in 2023, going from 629 million euros in 2021 to 750 million last year, of which 600 million in exports, as reported in an article entitled “ Trade exchange Italy-Iran, more growth in 2023”, and published by the Italian Chamber of Commerce website.
In a 2022 interview, Roberto Pasca di Magliano, director of the School of Financial Cooperation and Development- Unitelma Sapienza in Rome said:
“Italy will become Iran’s first trading partner among EU members. Economic relations between the two countries have developed positively since the signing of the nuclear agreement. Economic operators and political parties of both countries, through a precise understanding of each other’s national interests, have been able to create the conditions for the development of economic relations. The significant decrease in the volume of economic relations between the two countries in 2021 is mainly due to external factors and in the last year in particular to two main elements: US policies towards Iran and the effects of the coronavirus epidemic. The Islamic Republic of Iran has always emphasized its full willingness to interact with Italy in various areas of bilateral cooperation including in the political, regional, economic and commercial fields”.
These are all factors that must be carefully considered to understand the full picture.
The aftermath and a few considerations
The fact that Abedini was a regime’s big shot is confirmed by Teheran’s reaction. If it had not been worth it, the Iranian regime would certainly not have implemented such a mobilization, risking compromising relations with a friendly European country.
Sala’s arrest was functional to the release of Abedini, and Iran’s objective had even been confirmed by a statement of its own embassy in Rome posted on X on January 2nd 2025 and reported by the Italian news site Il Sussidiario: “Iranian ambassador confirms link between Sala and Abedini arrests”.
On January 13th 2025, well-known journalist and war correspondent Fausto Biloslavo, confirmed the deal in an article for the newspaper Il Giornale, indicating it as a “deferred exchange” that reflects Italy’s national interest in bringing home safe and sound a journalist, used as a “hostage”.
However, it is interesting to notice how some within the Italian government, the political arena and the media, attempted to present the two cases as unconnected. For instance, on the day of Sala’s release, the Italian Foreign Minister, Antonio Tajani, backed this version and stated: “The Iranians themselves have separated the two things”, quoting a sudden change of position by the Iranian regime on January 6th, when it claimed that Sala’s arrest was unrelated to Abedini’s case as the Italian reporter was accused of violating Iranian Islamic laws.
On January 10th, in a short interview published in an article by the Italian newspaper Il Giornale and entitled: “Sala’s release is a success of irregular diplomacy”, former ambassador and former intelligence director, Giampiero Massolo, also stated:
“And I think it is important to underline that there was no contextuality between the extradition of the Iranian engineer and the liberation of Cecilia Sala”.
It is interesting to notice how, after Sala’s release, the Italian government, the political arena and a large portion of the media attempted to present the outcome as a great diplomatic success of the government and the intelligence apparatus, with very few daring to criticize it.
Humanely speaking, it’s indeed great to see Cecilia Sala free and far away from the claws of the Iranian regime, but the whole issue is way far from a success and rather a simple exchange with a terrorist regime who had taken a journalist as a hostage to free Abedini.
From a strategic perspective, the whole Abedini/Sala issue seems to be a fiasco from its early stages.
Firstly, as explained by former Italian foreign intelligence deputy chief, Marco Mancini, in an interview with the newspaper Il Riformista, the Italian foreign intel had two days to contact Sala and have her evacuated from Iran; the operation could have been accomplished in a few hours, however, that did not happen.
Secondly, why didn’t the Italian government make sure that no potential Italian targets were in Iran before proceeding with the arrest? Was the government even aware of the imminent arrest of Abedini, which was conducted by the Italian State Police in Milan’s Malpensa airport on an FBI request? Such a lack of prevention is puzzling and it is legitimate to ask whether Italy did not expect an immediate retaliation by the Iranian regime for Abedini’s arrest? If so, why?
As in the Almasri case, (discussed in “File 1: Najeem Almasri and the GNA connection – January 2025”), a potential malfunction of the Italian intelligence apparatus emerges, and the reasons are unclear.