Kamil Alboshoka
Abstract
Since the establishment of the current regime in 1979 after the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty, Iran has been facing a myriad of challenges in its pursuit of internal stability. This study, therefore, delves deeply into Iran’s most critical challenges, which are social and economic. These challenges profoundly impact integration, national solidarity, stability, and security. The study rigorously examines the implications of these challenges on the national security of the Arabian Gulf region, a region of significant global importance. In this respect, the main question of this study is: How do Iran’s sociocultural, economic, and national security challenges contribute to instability and security risks in the Gulf region? What are the historical context and underlying factors contributing to these challenges in Iran?
Iran seeks to transfer obstacles and conflicts to Arabian Gulf countries, which are considered a dangerous phenomenon for security in various fields. Therefore, this study aims to review sociocultural, economic, national security, and transnational conflict transformation theories to understand and confront the danger posed by Iran.
The study’s findings indicate that Iran’s internal crises and efforts to spread its revolutionary and Shiite ideologies have resulted in the formation and support of terrorist groups that pose a threat to the national security of the Arabian Gulf states. Consequently, Iran aims to destabilize the security of the Gulf states by controlling Iraq and the northern part of Yemen through sectarian militias. It is clear that Iran exploited the Iraqi situation after 2003 to spread its tools and policies abroad to destabilize the region’s security and stability.
Introduction
Under the current regime, Iran has had a constitution and parliament since 1979, which are supposed to guarantee equal rights to all citizens. However, in reality, many Iranians experience discrimination based on their ethnicity, social class, gender, and religion. This discrimination leads to economic pressures and the deprivation of fundamental human rights for specific individuals and communities in the country. As a result of the numerous crises in Iran and the political conflicts with the West, Iran has been facing several internal challenges. Byman et al. (2021) argue that Iran has adopted a strategic policy of transferring the internal chaos towards the Gulf region.[i] Hossein Ziya (2021) also noted, “Iran’s policy aims to prevent the spread of social and economic tensions, which could further undermine the Iranian state.”[ii]
In this context, the Iranian regime deploys two approaches to exert its influence: internal sociocultural and economic pressures and intimidation about Iran’s future if internal tensions intensify. Moreover, they employ the Shiite approach to export their revolution and infiltrate regional societies, especially those in the Arabian Gulf states. This pursuit of control over Iraq and Yemen would strategically situate the Iranian regime to dominate the north and south of the Arabian Gulf states. However, this particular interest in controlling the region has led to the neglect of minorities and other communities in Iran, who constitute most of the country’s population. Rohrs-Weist (2018) highlights that “this discrimination poses a significant challenge to political stability in Iran.”[iii]
In today’s era, due to the rise of patriotic and nationalist thought, the Iranian regime has become more cautious. The increasing internal conflicts and external pressures facing Iran’s authorities have led to the transfer of these issues abroad. Therefore, Iran intends to use the same internal tensions (within Iran) to incite instability in the Arabian Gulf countries to shift global attention from Iran to the Gulf region.
The Iranian regime has consistently followed a conservative and extremist policy towards the Arabian Gulf states since the Islamic Revolution began. After Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took power in Iran in 2005 and the extremist movement gained prominence, Iran’s approach towards the Gulf states shifted from a conservative policy involving media conflicts to a more direct and aggressive approach.[iv] Iran also benefited from supporting extremist militias in Iraq in training armed groups (considered terrorist groups) against the Arabian Gulf states, especially targeting Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The actions of the Iranians caused the level of relations between the two sides to shift from competition to hostility. For example, in 2016, Saudi Arabia severed all diplomatic ties with Iran after the attack on the Saudi embassy and consulate in Tehran and Mashhad under the pretext of protesting the execution of Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia.[v]
The actions of Iran’s ruling regime have caused the Arabian Gulf states to perceive Iran as a threat. Hence, it is crucial to study Iran’s challenges to understand Iranian foreign policy and potential threats against the Arabs. Iran, a nation facing a myriad of internal challenges, aims to transfer conflicts abroad to ease internal tensions and suppress protests without intense international pressure. Therefore, this study aims to examine how Iran’s internal challenges affect the national security of the Arabian Gulf.
This study also analyses the potential impacts on the stability and security of the Arabian Gulf by examining regional rivalries, domestic instability, border disputes, and terrorism using national security theory. The study seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of Iran’s sociocultural, economic, and national security challenges. By contextualizing these challenges and exploring their potential impacts on the Gulf, the study aims to provide a comprehensive perspective to address them.
Theoretical Framework
To achieve stability, a state needs to establish governmental authority within specific territorial boundaries, respect national culture through educational institutions, promote public participation in politics, and strengthen national solidarity. Smith (1991: 14) argues that “a nation’s identity is shaped by its continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of values, symbols, memories, myths, and traditions. This pattern, heritage, and cultural elements also influence the identity of individuals.” Therefore, every government is responsible for expanding civil rights to citizens of every culture and race living within its borders.[vi]
Al-Rodhan and Kuepfer (2007) emphasize that “the stability of any country, regardless of its size, is vital for the stability of the entire international system in today’s globalised world.” It’s important to note that there are diverse avenues to achieve stability, such as through Western-style democracies or good and effective governance that align with local cultures, histories, and respect for people’s rights. Thus, a stable state aims to safeguard human dignity, equality, and prosperity among its citizens. Government capacity, rational statehood, human rights, development, and economic integration are also the hallmarks of stable states.[vii] Conversely, factors such as indebtedness and environmental, political, and economic degradation can jeopardize stability.
Furthermore, the stability of a country is a complex interplay of various factors, with socio-cultural and economic aspects emerging as key players in this dynamic. It’s important to note that people often prioritize economic and cultural stability over their other needs. However, the emergence of a regime with a fanatical political ideology can be a game-changer. Such a scenario can pose a direct threat to the state’s stability, potentially leading to the government’s confrontations with neighboring countries. This, in turn, can escalate internal tensions and cast a dark shadow over regional security.
Cohen et al. (2017) underscore the importance of cross-cultural communication, stating that “it is vital for global stability.” They argue that culture is a fundamental dimension of societal coherence, with language, art, cuisine, history, and unique traditions providing a rich tapestry to countries. However, they strongly caution that depriving any group of their culture can lead to severe cultural clashes. Consequently, this may increase the likelihood of threats at national borders and transnational risks, impacting peace and prosperity, thereby emphasizing the urgency and necessity of cross-cultural communication.[viii]
In the context of national security strategies, it is crucial to consider the sociocultural values of a society. Ignoring, neglecting or excluding these values can lead to costly mistakes, which is why most governments prioritize the protection of national values and societal cultures to achieve stability and development. Sociocultural values, which are passed down from homes to the entire community, play a pivotal role in shaping society. As Radcliffe-Brown (1990) eloquently stated, “culture is a set of rules that embody the fundamental ideals that give a society its identity.”[ix] William (1985) argued that culture “is a way of life that expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour.” Taylor (1986) also defined culture as “a complex whole that includes knowledge, beliefs, art, moral law, customs, and any other habits acquired by human beings as members of society. Hence, culture refers to the totality of people’s ways of life in a particular society at a particular time.”[x]
In the field of maintaining stability, the focus is to flourish the state’s economy to protect society from any tensions that may affect its behavior. Economic theory, as expounded by Becker (2007), emerges as the most comprehensive theory for protecting stability in all social systems.[xi] The development of the economy is not something inherent, natural, and pre-existing but must always be supported. Therefore, the state possesses the capacity to reshape society’s economic landscape, catalyzing development and growth by fostering the necessary political, social, and security environment.[xii]
There are currently several approaches to studying and analyzing the economy and its effects on security. The goal is to protect a country’s stability from economic pressures that can disrupt internal and regional security. Although there is no collective agreement on how to dissect the impact of the economy on security, scholars and schools of thought in this field have contributed to a broader understanding of the concept of economy and security. Therefore, comprehending economic theory and its impact on societies and their behaviors can either promote stability or lead to instability.
Scholars mostly link the economy to national security through various issues such as the industrial base, military spending, economic sanctions, and export controls. However, from the public’s perspective, economic security has a broader meaning. Thus, both macroeconomic and microeconomic perspectives are essential for any state. This understanding, which encompasses the broader economic landscape and the individual components of the economy, is vital for effective financial planning and decision-making. Macroeconomic issues focus on budget and deficit reduction, while microeconomic issues focus on providing the people’s general welfare and supporting all state components. Consequently, insecurity can negatively impact economic growth by reducing investment, increasing unemployment, and decreasing government revenue.[xiii]
In essence, national security is a complex concept with varying definitions depending on one’s perspective. Cooley (2011) presents a straightforward definition from George Kennan, a career Foreign Service Officer in the US Department of State: “the uninterrupted ability of a country to manage its domestic affairs without notable external intervention.”[xiv] However, Morton Berkowitz and Bookes (1968) defined national security as a “nation’s ability to preserve its internal values from external dangers,” which is still inadequate because it ignores the threat within a country.[xv] This critique highlights the need for a more comprehensive understanding of national security, which is influenced by a range of factors, including political unrest, economic inequality, uneven regional development, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic hostility, geopolitical rivalries, demographics, national resources, defense and foreign policy, perceptions of external threats (transnational threats), internal security due to internal dissent and externally motivated actions, and national morality and willpower to defend national interests.
The term ‘transnational threats’ covers a range of cross-border, non-state and security challenges that have become a consistent feature of modern stabilization contexts. Chief among these are organized crime, terrorism, insurgency, irregular migration, and elements of ‘hybrid’ warfare. These threats are also linked to supply chains, networks, and ideological movements from parties or countries against the stability of other countries.[xvi] Galtung (1996) points out that “conflict transformation (‘transnational threats) is the process of moving from regimes accustomed to the conflict to a peaceful state. In this process, some regimes wish to transfer conflicts to other regimes through armed groups or by creating internal tensions to change the government in certain states. As such, conflict transformation comprises a group of theories that aim to shift conflicting behaviors and motivations to other parties.”[xvii]
Iran’s challenges
Socio-cultural challenge
According to the US Department of State, in 2022, Iran’s population is estimated to be around 86.8 million people.[xviii] Persians account for around 40% of the population, while the remaining are non-Persian groups such as Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Baloch, Turkmen, and other ethnic groups.[xix] However, there are differing perspectives on the ethnic composition of Iran. For instance, Ali Akbar Salehi, the former Iranian Foreign Minister in 2012, noted during his visit to Turkey that “40% of Iranians are Turks.” Hamid Reza Haj Babaei, Iran’s Minister of Education, also declared in 2009 that “70% of Iranian people are bilingual,” suggesting that less than 30% of Iran’s population identifies as Persian. As for religious affiliation, the majority of the population in Iran are Muslims, constituting approximately 99%, out of which 15-20% are Sunni Muslims. The rest of the population belongs to other religious minorities (CIA, 2022).[xx]
Iran’s social structure is composed of various ethnicities, so their communication and interaction are heavily influenced by their interests and security concerns caused by the Iranian regime. The people of Iran tend to identify themselves more with their regional and ethnic affiliations rather than a unified national identity. Religious affiliations also play a significant role in Iranian society, with the Shiite sect being the dominant group supported by the regime and its allies. Other religious groups, including Sunnis and minorities, are also present but often face marginalization. As a result of these factors, Iranian society endures notable isolation.[xxi] Therefore, Iran can be divided into eight regions in terms of ethnic, social, and religious divisions:
- The Azerbaijan region in Iran’s north and northwest, including large areas in Tehran, is home to a large population of Turks, predominantly Shiite Muslims.[xxii]
- The Kurdistan region is situated in western Iran, bordering Iraq and Turkey. The majority of Kurds follow Sunni Islam.
- Ahwaz region is located in the southwest and south of Iran, bordering Iraq and the Arabian Gulf. The population consists of both Sunni and Shiite Muslims, as well as a Mandaean minority.[xxiii]
- Baluchistan is situated in southeastern Iran and shares its border with Pakistan. It is important to note that the people residing in Baluchistan follow Sunni Islam.
- The Turkmen Sahara region is located on the border of Turkmenistan. Additionally, the Turkmen population in Iran is predominantly Sunni Muslim.
- Lorestan, Bakhtiari, and Boyer Ahmad provinces are home to the Lor and Bakhtiari people, whose residents are Shiite Muslims.
- The Persian provinces are located inside Iran, up to Khorasan. Persians are mostly Shiite Muslims. However, there are also Sunni Muslims, as well as Christians, Baha’is, and Zoroastrians.
- The capital of Iran, Tehran, is situated in the central part of the country and has a unique demographic makeup due to the presence of Persians, Azerbaijanis, and other minority groups. The dominant religion in Tehran is Islam, with a Sunni population of approximately one million. Additionally, there are minority populations who follow Judaism, Christianity, and other religions.[xxiv]
In addition, Iran faces a significant challenge in bringing together its diverse population and regions to achieve national unity under the control of a single language and ethnicity. Therefore, the ethnic, religious, and regional commonalities have not created true national unity between these regions. Hence, the main obstacles to achieving national solidarity and integration are related to social context, ethnic conflicts, and discrimination between the different components of the population. Additionally, many Iranians are deeply devoted to Shiism, which has led to the emergence of ideological heterogeneity in the country. The Iranian regime’s clerics have shown no leniency towards religious opponents, causing difficulties for the country’s religious minorities.[xxv]
National unity in Iran is achieved by disregarding the cultural identity of most people in the country, a strategy that is met with strong opposition from ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities. In Iran, national solidarity is primarily expressed around the axis of one nation (Persian) and one faith (Twelver Shiite), with nationalism equating to allegiance to the governing system. The Iranian government, in its pursuit of reinforcing national identity, employs fear tactics to intimidate people, particularly those in the central regions (Persian), about Iran’s future if internal tensions escalate. This strategy has led to significant social and cultural issues Iran faces today.
Moreover, Iran is attempting to deflect domestic tension by inventing a fictional external enemy to shift focus away from the regime. As a result, Iran is striving to disrupt peace and instigate conflicts in the Arabian Gulf to distract both the Iranian population and the international community, particularly the West, from engaging in conflicts beyond Iran’s borders.[xxvi] It is worth noting that interference in the affairs of countries has been part of the Iranian regime’s slogan since 1979, which is to export the revolution to neighboring countries. However, this ideology gained momentum during the social and economic conflicts and tensions in Iran, which led to chaos and almost daily demonstrations and protests in the country. On this basis, it is possible to understand the reasons for the differences between Shiites and Sunnis, which are fueled by the Iranian regime in the Arabian Gulf countries and surrounding countries, such as Iraq and Yemen. Thus, on the one hand, it gives Iran credibility to suppress the Sunnis in the country, and on the other hand, it exploits this possibility to strengthen its position under the pretext of supporting Shiites in the world, specifically in the Arabian Gulf region.[xxvii]
Iran has been promoting Twelver Shiism in its culture, education, and judicial system since 1979.[xxviii] This policy has impacted, in one way or another, all non-Shiite religious trends in the country. The Iranian regime has used seminaries linked to the authorities to justify its actions and laws against its people and neighboring countries, claiming to defend the oppressed and the Shiites.[xxix] The regime has also collaborated with some seminaries and academic universities to train and deploy graduates from both inside and outside of Iran to propagate its ideology in their communities. Sectarian scientific fields in Iran have grown significantly and have become the promoters of the regime’s political, religious, social, and cultural ideology, consuming a significant portion of the state budget. Consequently, any religious activity outside the official doctrine is prohibited and treated harshly in Iran.[xxx]
The apparent reason for this can be seen in the failure of the Iranian regime to reduce and curb discrimination, inequality and corruption and the inability to solve the economic crisis. This causes significant challenges in Iran, such as religious tensions and ethnic and regional divisions. Therefore, it will affect the country’s stability and societal cohesion.
Economic challenge
The Iranian people are facing severe economic challenges due to a multitude of factors, including sanctions, corruption, unemployment, inflation, and poor resource management. Economists in Iran believe these challenges significantly impact the country’s economic development, stability, infrastructure, administrative behavior, and potential for regional economic cooperation. It is important to note that the economic variables that can lead to either equilibrium or instability depend on the outlook and economic model that governs society.
Farshad Parvizian, vice president of the Iranian Economists Association, has identified a need for a clear economic paradigm and scientific understanding of economic relations as fundamental challenges facing Iran’s current economy. Parvizian suggests that reforming the financial sector, the tax system, the money market, and the capital market could help solve the inflation problem.[xxxi] Meanwhile, some researchers have pointed out that each country has a specific economic definition and model, such as a free, closed, or mixed economy or a model related to economic globalization. Therefore, Iran’s economic model needs to be clarified. On the other hand, others believe the Iranian economy is considerably affected by political conflicts with the international community due to Iran’s regional and internal behavior.[xxxii]
Iran’s economy heavily relies on oil, which makes it vulnerable to the fluctuations of the global oil market. The economic sanctions have further devastated Iran’s economy due to the regime’s behavior. This dependence on a single source of income means that future economic growth is not guaranteed. To tackle this issue, the regime has implemented many populist economic policies, which have resulted in inflation and unrest. These policies have also eliminated government support for sectors vital to citizens’ needs, further exacerbating the economic situation. The resulting inflation and instability pose a threat to the foundations of the Iranian regime.
After the revolution in 1979, the new political regime in Iran prioritized strengthening the country’s economy. Achieving social justice in the economic system was crucial to Iran’s goals. As a result, the 1979 Constitution included an entire chapter (Chapter IV) devoted to the economy and financial affairs, affirming the authorities’ commitment to the following: (a) providing necessities to all Iranians, (b) eliminating poverty and deprivation, (c) prohibiting usury and extravagance, (d) moving towards self-sufficiency in agricultural production, and (e) preventing economic domination. Consequently, the state was assigned a dominant role in the national economy to achieve these objectives. Article 44 of the Iranian Constitution stipulated that the state sector must include the country’s leading industries such as oil and gas, foreign trade, significant minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams, irrigation networks, radio and television, postal, telegraph, and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, and railways.[xxxiii]
After the 1979 revolution, political factions within the Iranian state took control of strategic sectors of the economy, such as energy, which presented a significant challenge to the country’s economic stability. The political outlook, harmful competition with regional countries, the ideology of exporting the revolution, and the internal political approach contributed to this challenge. For instance, during the war with Iraq at the beginning of the revolution, all major economic activities slowed down, leading to high inflation rates of 17.7%. Inflation rates continued to rise between 1989 and 1996 during Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency, peaking at 22.3%. Inflation decreased to 14.7% during Mohammad Khatami’s government period between 1997 and 2004 and reached 14.1% during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency.[xxxiv] It is worth noting that during the Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi governments, inflation rates reached dangerous levels, threatening citizens’ economies. All these factors are due to the state’s control over the country’s strategic economic sectors and the economy’s connection to its regional policies. The Iranian economy suffered significant shocks due to the economic blockade on state-controlled oil, mineral, and other sectors, which resulted in a severe decline in exports, a shortage of foreign currency, and a decrease in foreign investment.
The economic situation in Iran, as assessed by experts, is dire. The country’s heavy reliance on military bases, arms production, and financial aid for militias has severely compromised its macroeconomic security, including its annual budget. This, in turn, has triggered a collapse in the microeconomy, leading to a significant decline in public welfare. The repercussions are evident in the alarming rise of unemployment, poverty, and economic marginalization across the country.
Iranian officials reported an increase in the misery index across 14 provinces in 2023 compared to the previous year. The rise in the poverty index is due to an increase in annual inflation and unemployment rates, leading to consequences such as increased crime, social unrest, and decreased investor interest. Several experts have pointed to the mismanagement of the regime’s as one of the factors behind the spread of poverty in Iran. Economist Farshad Momeni, citing official data, has stated that “around one in three Iranians is poor in the absolute sense.” He also warned that for the first time in the last century, the number of poor people in Iran is expected to double in less than three years. Economic expert Mahmoud Jamsaz has previously spoken to Iranian media about the poverty line turning into a hunger line, stating that “20 million people in the country have neither shelter nor even a minimum income.”[xxxv]
Impact on internal national unity and security
As previously noted, providing citizens with the necessities of life, eliminating poverty and deprivation, agricultural development, and preventing economic domination are among the most important goals of the Iranian Revolution. However, the Iranian state failed to achieve these goals due to various reasons, such as political factors, the regime’s ideology of controlling regional countries and using repressive policies towards citizens.
The Iranian regime has imposed its sectarian values and political ideology on all Iranian citizens, particularly non-Persian ethnic nations, preventing them from defining their social and cultural identity. In this case, establishing social and cultural institutions is limited only to those aligned with the Iranian regime and its agenda. Thus, a heterogeneous society emerges in Iran due to social tensions and economic deprivation. As a result, there have been widespread protests and armed conflicts across the country, posing a significant threat to its security and political stability.[xxxvi]
In Iran, ethnic and regional identity trumps Iranian patriotism. Therefore, Iranian nationalism cannot be considered a unified concept due to the country’s highly diverse social structure (Ansari, 2007: 18). Thus, the regime’s persecution of citizens creates a significant hurdle in the field of civil rights, particularly for individuals and social groups striving to preserve their ethnic identity. Consequently, a lack of intimate relationship between this type of society and the ruling authority leads to social crises and cultural and economic poverty.[xxxvii]
The existence of a sociocultural and economic conflict between the Iranian regime and societal components in Iran has made the Iranian regime concerned about the spread of the crisis from one region to another within Iran. Therefore, the sectarian and political ideology of the Iranian regime, coupled with its hostility towards the cultural demands of all societies and ethnic national groups in Iran, has fueled the worsening of economic and cultural crises. Moreover, popular demands such as women’s and children’s rights, as well as the minorities’ rights, have also added to the complexity of the conflict. The Iranian regime is also facing formidable challenges from the West, Israel, and other regional countries, which are further heightening the situation.
The critical economic and social situation in Iran prompts the regime to use force, violence, executions, and massacres to contain political and social crises (US Department of State, 2022). Consequently, the security and political costs for the authorities have become prohibitive. For example, the Iranian regime has committed several massacres to contain protests since the late 1980s, from executing thousands of political prisoners to killing intellectuals during the Khatami government to committing a massacre in November 2019 to suppressing protests in September 2022. All these violations and failure to manage the country’s economy and culture indicate the regime’s failure to achieve its economic goals. As a result, the Iranian regime sees no choice but to use violence to curb the protests in the country.[xxxviii]
Indicators of success for state stability are relevant to integration, national solidarity, respect for cultures, and citizenship rights, especially economic rights.[xxxix] However, the internal situation in Iran is unstable for reasons related to the lack of integration and homogeneity among the Iranian people. As a result, the Iranian regime tries to assimilate diverse cultures and ethnicities into a single national culture that aligns with its agenda. The country’s stifling economic crisis has also contributed significantly to the protests and demonstrations that have erupted throughout Iran, further worsening the internal instability.
Moreover, discrimination is one of the clear manifestations of a lack of respect for citizenship rights in Iran. The most significant discrimination in the country is against women and religious and ethnic minorities. For example, in Iran, there is no minister from religious minorities. Many Iranian people are also exposed to severe social and economic pressures due to this regime’s tendency toward political and religious extremism and its preoccupation with regional crises. Furthermore, under the Iranian regime’s law, the rights of Iranian women are severely restricted, which is a form of persecution. On September 16, 2022, protests erupted across Iran over the tragic death of Mahsa Amini, 22, by Tehran’s morality police. Hundreds of demonstrators, including dozens of children and women, were killed by Iranian forces in these protests.[xl]
It is worth noting that in addition to the conflict between the regime and the Iranian people, the divisions within the regime have become very serious since the arrival of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. The fundamentalist camp and the religious factions on one side and the reformists on the other have been in significant conflict. Following the controversial presidential elections in 2009, political conflicts became securitized, and the scope of competition increasingly narrowed. Upon receiving orders from the senior leadership to ensure greater security for the regime, the security services detained Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi in their homes. The reason for their detainment was on charges of destabilizing the security and stability of the state.[xli] This has also contributed to the general lack of frank and vocal reactions to removing subsidies on a range of consumer goods in the country since December 2010. However, the Iranian people have protested these exclusionary policies, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries and detainees.[xlii]
Impact of Iran’s challenges on Arabian Gulf national security
The Iranian state has been unable to overcome the most pressing issues related to people’s livelihood. Therefore, Iran always tries to deflect internal pressures by creating conflicts with Arabian Gulf countries. This strategy aims to divert attention from internal crises and attract the attention of the West and the Iranian people to external causes.
Iran believes that internal challenges, specifically the cultural and economic crisis that the country is experiencing, will lead to the collapse of Iran’s regime. Thus, the Iranian regime’s agenda of controlling the internal economy and the idea of exporting the revolution, supporting the oppressed, and protecting the Shiite doctrine will face a miserable failure. Therefore, Iran seeks to form military capabilities and regional alliances with terrorist groups and militias to transfer its internal crises to the Arabian Gulf states. Hence, Iran is studying the theory of regional dynamics and the political and cultural geography of the Arabian Gulf region so that it can threaten the national security of the Gulf states through proxy conflicts. Furthermore, Iran’s social and economic challenges contribute to transnational threats, such as terrorism, organized crime, and extremism. Iran is also attempting to create fertile ground for the spread of threats through its clients and agents in the region, including the Gulf region, specifically Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, to threaten the unity and territorial integrity of the Gulf states.[xliii]
Iran’s rulers utilize the country’s wealth, mainly derived from oil and gas, to fuel political rivalries in the region to spread sectarian, political and cultural ideology to tear countries apart. The income obtained from the sale of oil is used to provide weapons and equip terrorist groups in regional countries such as Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain. These actions are part of the Iranian regime’s plan to destabilize the Arabian Gulf countries.[xliv]
Many Shiite clerics in the Arabian Gulf states and their neighbors, such as Iraq and Yemen, have completed their religious studies in Qom and Mashhad, Iran. They later attained important positions and responsibilities in their home countries with financial, political, cultural, and sectarian support from Iran.[xlv] For example, extremist militias have been in control of the Iraqi state since 2003. In 2014, the Houthi militia occupied Sanaa, which may have caused security crises by challenging the unity of people within the Gulf states.[xlvi] This may lead to sectarian extremism that aims to target the stability of the states, especially in the border governorates between Iraq and the north and eastern region of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, as well as Yemen and the southern governorates of Saudi Arabia and recently threatened trade in the Red Sea, located west of Saudi Arabia. Iranian embassies and IRGC forces in the region assist sectarian groups, which are considered hostile to their country. They also encourage young people from these countries to study in Iranian universities and religious centers. Additionally, they support the formation of terrorist groups by providing financial, military, and political aid.[xlvii]
Terrorist groups close to Iran are also carrying out bombings in the central governorates of Saudi Arabia, even threatening Mecca and Medina, as well as targeting the territorial integrity of Bahrain. Therefore, Iran uses its agents in Yemen and Iraq to target companies and economic institutions, specifically oil companies in Saudi Arabia, with missiles and drones to preoccupy the Arabian Gulf states with internal conflicts and security threats. It is vital to take note of the fact that the actions of Iranian groups in the Gulf states could potentially transform into pressure groups or serve as a means of espionage for Iran. Additionally, the proliferation of extremist sectarian ideologies associated with Iran could result in the emergence of terrorist groups and organizations within the Arabian Gulf states. One of the serious threats to national security in the Gulf states is the infiltration of sectarianism associated with the Iranian regime into state institutions to create sectarian tensions.
No question, Iran, in its foreign policy, always considers Saudi Arabia a dangerous competitor in the Islamic world and even the international order. Jones et al. (2019) indicated that “Iran has always taken measures against the stability of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, supporting terrorist groups poses a threat to the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.” Consequently, supporting terrorism at the governmental level has dealt a devastating blow to the body of the international order due to targeting the economy, specifically energy such as oil.[xlviii]
Iran continues to threaten the territorial integrity of the Arabian Gulf states from all directions, including the Red Sea, with its participation and coordination with terrorism in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Iran aims to reduce Saudi Arabia’s regional, Islamic and Arab power by involving it in internal conflicts and border disputes with non-state actors in Yemen and Iraq. As a result, Iran exploits the instability in Iraq and Yemen to further its agenda of transnational threats against regional security and stability.
Iran’s occupation of three islands belonging to the UAE, coupled with its refusal to engage in any dialogue, raises serious concerns. These actions indicate Iran’s intention to exploit the three islands, posing a direct threat to the economic and political security of the Arabian Gulf states, notably the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Furthermore, Iran’s provocative statements against the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Bahrain, claiming that Bahrain is part of Iranian territory, further exacerbate the situation. This behavior underscores Iran’s lack of respect for state sovereignty and its disregard for regional peace and stability, potentially leading to significant repercussions for the Arabian Gulf states.[xlix]
Conclusion
Iran, like any post-revolutionary country, is facing an economic crisis. Thus, stabilizing its sociocultural and security conditions is complicated. Although the Iranian regime has taken some steps to reform social and cultural institutions and respect citizens’ rights, these steps appear to have been taken due to internal and external pressures. However, these initial steps are insufficient to address Iran’s deep-rooted internal crises. The root causes of these problems stem from the regime’s focus on controlling the region while neglecting the problems within Iran itself.
Discrimination against religious, ethnic, and national minorities, as well as women, is one of the major causes contributing to the sociocultural crisis in Iran. The Iranian regime has been unable to find a consistent and effective solution to end the crisis as it requires the participation of all social and ethnic components in Iran to cooperate with the central authority. However, this would mean the emergence and growth of civil society, which is contradictory and destructive to the regime’s nature in Iran. As a result, the Tehran regime prefers to confront the population in Iran, particularly non-Persians, and shift the conflict abroad, specifically to the Arabian Gulf states. It does so by using the same internal crises in Iran and creating terrorist militias to overthrow countries and destroy social and economic structures. This strategy is especially concerning, considering the current developments in the Middle East.
The Iranian regime cannot be considered a stable state that supports development within its country. As a result, it cannot contribute to international forums. Therefore, the Iranian regime believes that the world’s preoccupation with conflicts within the Arabian Gulf is the most important means of diverting the international community’s attention from Iran’s internal crises to external conflicts. Based on this logic, Iran attempts to create strife and an environment of violence between societies, ignite disputes and crises, and, ultimately, internal wars.
In general, the reliance on sectarian extremism and violent policies, such as the idea of exporting the revolution, in addition to transferring internal problems, has created challenges for the Arabian Gulf states, specifically Saudi Arabia. The Iranian regime’s promotion of sectarian extremism as a core religious ideology has led to the emergence of terrorist organizations. These groups not only pose a threat to countries neighboring Saudi Arabia but also to the national security of Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf region, including Bahrain and Kuwait. Therefore, the existence of these groups is a significant concern for the Arabian Gulf countries.
In conclusion, it can be stated that Iran, being a significant and extensive country in the Middle East that connects Arab countries to Central Asia, comprises various social groups with distinct social, cultural, ethnic, and religious values. It is essential to appropriately coordinate different cultural values towards a national purpose to achieve significant development. This can be done by adapting these values as a strategy to attain national security rather than marginalizing all cultures, especially non-Persian ethnic groups and non-Shiite religious sects in Iran. By doing so, Iran can achieve social, economic, and political stability and cease spreading chaos against its Arab neighbors.
Endnotes
[i] Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Jerrold D. Green, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era: Impact on Foreign Policies (US: Rand National Defence Research Institute, 2001), 72-77
[ii] Hossein Ziya Mohammad, “The 13 crises facing Iran”, the Middle East Institute (blog), September 16, 2021, https://www.mei.edu/publications/13-crises-facing-iran
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[vii] Sara Kuepfer, Nayef Al-Rodhan, Stability of States: The Nexus Between Transnational Threats, Globalization, and Internal Resilience, Editions Slatkine, (Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2007), 150.
[viii] Joseph V. Cohen et al., Modelling Sociocultural Influences on Decision Making: Understanding Conflict, Enabling Stability. (New York: Taylor and Francia Group, 2016), 576.
[ix] John Wiley, Anthropology in Theory: On Social Stricture, second edition. Henrietta L. Moore, Todd Sanders (UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), 624.
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[xi] Gary Becker, Economic Theory, 2nd Edition (New York: Routledge, 2017), 242.
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[xv] Anand K. Singh, “Concept of National Security: An Overview,” Volume 2, Issue 12 (December 2015), 1920-1925, https://www.jetir.org/papers/JETIR1701686.pdf
[xvi] “Addressing transnational threats in stabilisation contexts”, the UK Government (website), 2017, https://shorturl.at/kmotO
[xvii] Johan Galtung, Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (UN: United Nations Disaster Management Training Programme, 2000), 3-9.
[xviii] US Department of State, Office of International Religious of Freedom, 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iran, 2022, https://shorturl.at/MW028
[xix] Brenda Shaffer, “Iran is More Than Persia,” Foundation for Defence of Democracies, April 28, 2021, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/04/28/iran-is-more-than-persia/
[xx] CIA, The World Factbook, Iran, 2022, https://shorturl.at/kBSZ0
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[xxii] Emil Aslan Souleimanov, Josef Kraus, “Iran’s Azerbaijan Question in Evolution: Identity, Society, and Regional Security”, Institute for Security & Development Policy, September 2017, https://isdp.eu/publication/azeris-irans-azerbaijan-identity-society-regional-security/
[xxiii] Kamil Alboshoka, “Political Geography of Ahwaz”, Dialogue Institute for Research and Studies, May 25, 2023, https://astudies.org/2023/05/political-geography-of-ahwaz/
[xxiv] Iran Wire, Do Sunnis enjoy freedom under the Islamic Iranian regime?, Iran, February 25, 2022, (Arabic) https://shorturl.at/iDFUV
[xxv] Alam Saleh, Iran’s National Identity Problem. In: Ethnic Identity and the State in Iran, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137310873_4
[xxvi] Philip Loft, “Iran’s influence in the Middle East”, House of Commons Library, Number 9504 (April 14, 2023): 4-24, https://shorturl.at/djsyK
[xxvii] Mohammed Aly Sergie, “The Sunni-Shia Divide”, Council for Foreign Relations (April 27, 2023), https://www.cfr.org/article/sunni-shia-divide
[xxviii] Mehdi Khalaji, Iran’s Regime of Religion (New York: Journal International Affairs, 2011), 131-147.
[xxix] Bin Bakhti Abdulhakim, “Security Plans to Address Iran’s Dangerous Behaviour in the Arabian Gulf” (September 28, 2020), https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/?p=8329
[xxx] Maryam Sinaiee, “Islamic Republic Enlists Foreign Students As Ideological Ambassadors”, Iran International, last modified November 21, 2023, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202311201032
[xxxi] Maryam Salimi, “Inflation has monetary roots and the tool to control it is the interest rate”, Tasnim News Agency, June 2, 2023, (Farsi) https://shorturl.at/ekqsw
[xxxii] Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, “What are the big economic challenges facing the government in Iran?” Economic Observatory, (March 3, 2023), https://www.economicsobservatory.com/what-are-the-big-economic-challenges-facing-the-government-in-iran
[xxxiii] Evaleila Pesaran, Challenges facing the Iranian economy: A Revolutionary Republic in Transition (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2012), 41-44.
[xxxiv] Ibid.
[xxxv] “Increase in inflation and unemployment rate; misery index in 14 provinces of Iran”. Voice of America (US), January 9, 2024. https://ir.voanews.com/a/iran-misery-index-proves-growth-of-misery-in-fourteen-provinces/7432853.html
[xxxvi] Kasra Aarabi, “The Fundamentals of Iran’s Islamic Revolution,” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, Chapter 1 (February 11, 2019), https://www.institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/fundamentals-irans-islamic-revolution
[xxxvii] Lutfi Sunar, “Nationalism in Iran: Nation-state, Nation-building, and the Iranian Identity”, The Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Muslim Socio-Political Thought, (New York: Routledge, 2021), 508.
[xxxviii] Dana Sammy, “Anti-Government Demonstrations in Iran: A Long-Term Challenge for the Islamic Republic”, The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), (April 12, 2023), https://shorturl.at/fzLU8
[xxxix] Giovanna Zincone, Tiziana Caponio, Rossella Carastro, “Integration Indicators”, Promoting Equality in Diversity, ILO of Geneva (2007): 1-35, https://shorturl.at/gkmJS
[xl] “Events in Iran since Mahsa Amini’s arrest and death in custody”. Reuters (UK), December 12, 2022. https://shorturl.at/bMU01
[xli] Mohammad Bashandi, “The rule of the jurist and the problem of party institutionalisation in Iran”, International Institute for Iranian Studies, (October 18, 2017), https://rasanah-iiis.org/parsi/?p=1467
[xlii] Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Iranian riot police out in force as food and fuel subsidies end”, The Guardian, December 19, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/19/iranian-riot-police-subsidies-end
[xliii] Weddington Derika, “Rivalry in the Middle East: The History of Saudi-Iranian Relations and its Implications on American Foreign Policy” (Science, Defence and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, 2017), 141, https://shorturl.at/cuGM3
[xliv] Ashley Lane, “Iran’s Islamist Proxies in the Middle East”, Wilson Centre, September 12, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-islamist-proxies
[xlv] Mohammad Abdullah Youssef Kamal, “Projections of Iranian Political Thought on the Arab Gulf States (2011-2016)”, PhD diss, (Arabic), (Middle East University, 2018)
[xlvi] John Chipman, “Iran’s Network of Influence In The Middle East”, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 224, (London: IISS, 2018), https://shorturl.at/gFKRT
[xlvii] Afshon Ostovar, “Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy and Identity Politics Collide”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (November 2016), https://shorturl.at/oAFM4
[xlviii] Seth G. Jones, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. Danika Newlee, Nicholas Harrington, “Iran’s Threat to Saudi Critical Infrastructure: The Implications of U.S.-Iranian Escalation”, Centre for Strategic International Studies, (August 2019): 13, https://shorturl.at/kuBLQ
[xlix] Bilal Saab, “Iran’s long game in Bahrain”, Atlantic Council, (December 18, 2018), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/irans-long-game-in-bahrain/